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“WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth 
decay. This is a message from the City and County of San Francisco.” 
 
I. Introduction 
Obesity had been declared a chronic disease by the American Medical Association, the 
American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists, the American College of Endocrinology, the 
Endocrine Society, the Obesity Society, the American Society of Bariatric Physicians, and the 
National Institutes of Health.1 Childhood obesity in the United States has imposed a particular 
burden on society, both in terms of healthcare costs and children’s physical and mental health.2 
A major contributing factor to the epidemic has been the food industry’s marketing directly to 
children and young adults.  
Research shows that children under eight years of age lack the necessary cognitive skills 
to understand neither the intent of advertising, nor that advertising often presents a biased point 
of view.3 Despite such a lack of understanding, food advertising and marketing has been shown 
to influence food preferences in children4— preferences which continue into adulthood. Thus, it 
is paramount that children develop good eating habits in their formative years. Studies have 
                                                 
1 Obesity in America: A Growing Concern, ENDOCRINEWEB, 
https://www.endocrineweb.com/conditions/obesity/obesity-america-growing-concern (last visited Dec 14, 2018). 
2 Jennifer Harris & Samantha K. Graff, Protecting Children from Harmful Food Marketing: Options for Local 
Government to Make a Difference, THE CHILDHOOD OBESITY EPIDEMIC 145–156 (2015); AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, https://www.apa.org/topics/kids-media/food.aspx (last visited Nov 14, 2018). 
3 Jennifer L. Harris & Samantha K. Graff, Protecting Young People From Junk Food Advertising: Implications of 
Psychological Research for First Amendment Law, 102 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 214–222 (2012). 
4 NOTE: Advertising and Childhood Obesity: The Role of the Federal Government in Limiting Children's Exposure 
to Unhealthy Food Advertisements, 66 Fed. Comm. L.J. 327.  
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shown that adults do not deviate from eating habits developed in childhood.5 Additionally, 
obesity in children can also lead to early on-set of co-morbidities such as high blood pressure, 
asthma, cardiovascular disease, and type-2 diabetes.6  
Despite the urgent need for action, the federal government as well as state and local 
governments have been unable to meaningfully impact rising obesity rates. Current obesity rates 
are still too high, with rates as high as 18.5 percent for children and 39.5 percent for adults in 
2015-2016.7 
In an effort to combat obesity, San Francisco County passed an ordinance in 2015 
requiring warning labels, such as the one written above, on specific sugar-sweetened beverages 
for certain types of fixed advertising within San Francisco.8  The ordinance requires the warnings 
to cover 20 percent of the advertising space of the advertisements on billboards, posters, walls, 
bus shelters, and buses.9 The stated purpose of the San Francisco ordinance is to “inform the 
public of the presence of added sugars and thus promote informed consumer choice that may 
result in reduced caloric intake and improved diet and health, thereby reducing illnesses to which 
[sugar-sweetened beverages] contribute.”10 
In pure American fashion, the American Beverage Association (ABA), the California 
Retailers Association (CRA), and the California State Outdoor Advertising Association 
                                                 
5 Advertising and Childhood Obesity, supra note 4; Roseann B. Termini, Thomas A. Roberto & Shelby G. Hostetter, 
Food Advertising and Childhood Obesity: A Call to Action for Proactive Solutions, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619 
(2011). 
6 Harris & Graff, supra note 2.  
7 Molly Warren, et al, The State of Obesity: Better Policies for a Healthier America, THE STATE OF OBESITY, 
https://stateofobesity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/stateofobesity2018.pdf (last visited Nov 14, 2018). 
8 S.F. Health Code § 4201 (stating the purpose in requiring warnings for SSBs is to “inform the public of the 
presence of added sugars” because consumption of SSBs is linked to serious health problems such as weight gain, 
obesity, heart disease, diabetes, tooth decay).   
9 S.F. Health Code §4203; S.F. Health Code §4202.  
10 Id. at §4203, supra note 9.   
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(CSOAA), sought their day in court and filed suit against the County in July 2015.11 The 
Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as conflicting with their First Amendment rights, stating the 
ordinance “violates their and/or their members’ free speech rights by forcing them to include a 
warning that they would not otherwise give.”12 
II. The U.S. Supreme Court, First Amendment, & Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech first received protected status under the First Amendment in 1976.13 
The U.S. Supreme Court believed consumers have a particular interest in the free flow of 
commercial information, suggesting, “that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”14 Though the commercial speech doctrine 
began as a method to protect the listeners’ freedom, the doctrine has transformed over time to 
protect the speaker as well.15  
In 1980, the Central Hudson framework was established by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
protect commercial speech and consists of four elements.16 The first element is a threshold 
question, asking if the commercial speech in question promotes illegal activity or is false or 
inherently misleading.17 If the activity is not illegal or inherently misleading, the ordinance then 
needs to meet the remaining three parts of Central Hudson.18 The ordinance must: involve a 
                                                 
11 Complaint. Am. Bev. Ass’n et. al. v. City & County of S.F., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
12 Id.; See also Am. Bev. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
13 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976).   
14 Id. at 763.  
15 Symposium: Nike v. Kasky and the Modern Commercial Free Speech Doctrine: Afterword: Free the Fortune 500! 
The Debate Over Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. 1277.   
16 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980). 
17 Id. at 564. 
18 Id. at 566. 
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substantial government interest19; directly advance that substantial interest20; and do so in a 
manner that is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.21 
Then, in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a separate standard for mandatory 
disclosures on advertising.22 In Zauderer, the Court stated a somewhat more lax standard for 
compelled disclosures in commercial advertising. The Court rationalized the need for a lower 
standard than Central Hudson, stating “extension of First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, 
[and a] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in 
…  advertising is minimal.”23 The Court stressed a more lenient standard was appropriate to 
protect against consumer deception "because disclosure requirements trench much more 
narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech," while recognizing that 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment 
by chilling protected commercial speech.”24 Consequently, the Court held that “an advertiser’s 
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception to consumers.”25  
III. Lack of Uniformity in the Application of the Zauderer Standard 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court developed the Zauderer standard back in 1985, various 
courts and circuits have interpreted and applied this framework somewhat differently creating 
more than a little confusion in the Ninth Circuit specifically.26 American Beverage has been 
                                                 
19 Id. at 565. 
20 Id. at 566. 
21 Id.  
22 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626 (1985).  
23 Id. at 651 (first emphasis added).   
24 Id.   
25 Id.  
26 See Am. Bev. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2018); American Beverage, 187 F. Supp. 3d 
supra note 12; Am. Bev. Ass'n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019).  
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analyzed by the District Court for the Northern District of California, and by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—under a three-judge panel and en banc—and each time, a slightly 
different version of the Zauderer framework has been applied.27  
 In analyzing the warning promulgated by the San Francisco County ordinance, the 
District Court concluded that the Zauderer framework would apply since “the challenged 
ordinance requires disclosure rather than suppression of speech.”28  It described the Zauderer 
standard as a rational basis/rational review test where the “compelled disclosure does not violate 
the First Amendment so long as the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s 
interest.”29 The District Court went on to state that the only element it considers relevant in 
analyzing the warning promulgated by the City of San Francisco under the Zauderer standard is 
whether the state’s interest is “reasonably related to the state’s interest”.30   
The District Court pointed out that the Ninth Circuit, in Videosoftware Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, might have imposed an additional analytical element on the Zauderer 
framework—specifically that the disclosure be shown to be factual before the analysis proceeds 
to the relatedness of the state’s interest.31 The District Court continued by stating, “it is not clear 
whether Zauderer itself imposed a factual predicate requirement—or, for that matter, a ‘factual 
and uncontroversial’ one.”32 The District Court opined that the “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” statement is—at most—a description of the state’s compelled disclosure.33  The 
District Court did not believe the U.S. Supreme Court imposed factual and uncontroversial 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 American Beverage, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1126.  
29 Id. at 1134.  
30 Id. at 1135.  
31 American Beverage, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1135; Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 
(9th Cir. 2009).  
32 American Beverage, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.  
33 Id.  
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predicate requirements on compelled disclosures before the statement can be analyzed under 
Zauderer.34  
The District Court, for the purposes of analyzing the San Francisco ordinance, proceeded 
with the assumption that there is a factual and uncontroversial requirement before rational review 
is to be applied to the compelled disclosure. At the same time, the District Court reaffirmed its 
analysis in CTIA, in which the court held the factual and uncontroversial requirement of 
Zauderer establishes that the compelled disclosure must convey a fact rather than opinion and, 
generally speaking, the disclosure must be accurate.35  
 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came to a different construction of the 
Zauderer framework contrary to the District Court’s application. Whereas the District Court 
believed the Zauderer analysis only needed to show a reasonable relation between the disclosure 
and the governmental interest, the Ninth Circuit transformed the Zauderer framework by 
analyzing the burden imposed by the disclosure separate and ahead of the reasonable relation of 
the government interest analyses.36 In every element, the Ninth Circuit agreed with petitioners’ 
arguments; holding that the disclosure required by the ordinance was in violation of petitioners’ 
First Amendment rights.37 The Ninth Circuit then clarified the applicable analysis under 
Zauderer for a compelled disclosure to survive First Amendment scrutiny by analyzing if the 
particular disclosure is (1) purely factual and uncontroversial, (2) not unduly burdensome and, 
(3) reasonably related to a substantial government interest.38 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 CTIA - Wireless Ass'n v. Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2017); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626.  
36 American Beverage, 871 F.3d at 898.  
37 Id. at 892-8.  
38 Id. at 892.  
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 Lastly, while agreeing that the Zauderer standard is the correct standard to apply, the 
decision by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, articulated a slightly different inquiry, requiring 
only that the compelled notice or warning be (1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and (3) not 
unjustified or unduly burdensome.39 With this new understanding of the Zauderer standard, the 
Ninth Circuit en banc shifted the focus from the substantiality of the governmental interest to 
solely on the notices’ purely factual and noncontroversial predicates and the burden it places on 
the advertiser. By requiring a separate analysis of the burden imposed by the disclosure, the 
Ninth Circuit transformed the Zauderer framework from rational review scrutiny to something 
akin to the intermediate scrutiny imposed by the Central Hudson test. 
IV. Conclusion 
The disparate treatment of the ordinance under the Zauderer analysis highlights the need 
for additional guidance and clarification in how this analysis should be applied. In any 
commercial speech framework, the first step in the analysis should be to determine if the speaker 
is being required to speak where he would prefer to be silent or if he is being regulated in the 
content of his speech. If it is the former, a policy rationale that allows for mandatory disclosures 
should be encouraged, not restricted.  
The question of when Zauderer should be applied and if it should only be applied in 
cases seeking to prevent consumer deception has been raised in lower courts and absent a ruling 
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the courts are free to apply the Zauderer standard to governmental 
interests beyond preventing consumer deception. In Zauderer, the Court stated, “an advertiser’s 
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception.”40 The Court used a new framework because the 
                                                 
39 American Beverage, 916 F.3d at 756.  
40 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
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government had an interest in preventing deception caused “inherently misleading” 
advertisements. However, the Court did not state if anything other than an interest in preventing 
deception could be appropriate in deciding to apply the Zauderer standard. It could be argued 
that only “inherently misleading” advertisements—advertisements which would fail the first 
prong of the Central Hudson test—are entitled to a less exacting standard. But what would be the 
purpose of such a standard when Central Hudson could have easily disposed of the “inherently 
misleading” advertising. Thus, it stands to reason that there must be some other instances in 
which Zauderer should apply.  
The U.S. Supreme Court should clarify the Zauderer standard—if Zauderer applies at all. 
Since the Court has yet to state which standard governs when restrictions on commercial speech 
are under review, it has become increasingly difficult to know which standard would be applied 
in advance of litigation or if the standard stated is the one actually used. It is plausible that the 
Court could find that other governmental interests beyond preventing deception can and should 
be analyzed under the Zauderer standard. Even if the Court were to hold that preventing 
deception is the only governmental interest that triggers Zauderer, the government could still 
achieve its goals by showing that certain advertising undertaken by companies and industry-
funded research aimed at weakening the link between sodas and obesity are a type of policy 
campaign that actually constitutes deception that would need to be countered with a warning 
label. In the absence of review by the U.S. Supreme Court, courts should apply a laxer standard 
for compelled disclosures that concern the public health such as the one originally crafted in 
Zauderer, as applied by the District Court of the Northern District of California. 
Legislators must be allowed to utilize compelled disclosures in their efforts to combat 
obesity rates, especially childhood obesity rates. The marketing of unhealthy foods to children 
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has contributed to a public health crisis and government intervention is sorely needed. Food 
advertising is exceedingly out of balance with what a healthy diet should be and needs to be 
curtailed and regulated.  
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